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a b s t r a c t
This paper studies the effects of bank accounting conservatism on
the pricing of syndicated bank loans. We provide evidence that
banks timelier in loss recognition charge higher spreads. We go
onto consider what happens to the relationship between spreads
and timeliness in loss recognition during the ﬁnancial crisis. During
the crisis, banks timelier in loss recognition increase their spreads
to a lesser extent than banks less timely in loss recognition. These
ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the argument that conditional
accounting conservatism serves a governance role. The policy
implication is that banks timelier in loss recognition exhibit more
prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This study examines the effect of timely loss recognition among banks on the yield spreads they
charge on syndicated loans. We base our theoretical rationale on the corporate governance role of
accounting conservatism. Agency conﬂicts between various parties to the ﬁrm are important drivers
for the existence of corporate governance provisions. Classical agency theory attempts to model such
conﬂicting relationships (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). For example, Jensen and Meckling
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(1976) highlight that a lack of alignment between managers and other stakeholders’ (e.g., sharehold-
ers’) interests creates incentives for managers to expropriate ﬁrm’s resources. Although contracts are
written to align the interests of related parties, nonetheless contracts cannot eliminate all agency costs
because of the incomplete nature of such contracts and thus assign signiﬁcant control rights to man-
agers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Accounting conservatism is expected to serve a corporate gover-
nance role whenever accounting numbers are used as managerial performance indicators in such
contracts.
Positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) stipulates that the use of accounting
numbers in contracts can create incentives for managers to use aggressive accounting methods to
accelerate gain recognition and/or delay loss recognition. Therefore, accounting numbers that are gen-
erated under conditionally conservative accounting can enhance contracting efﬁciency and the miti-
gation of agency costs (Watts, 2003). Existing studies (Beekes et al., 2004; Lobo and Zhou, 2006;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009) suggest that timely loss recognition can facilitate
monitoring and contribute to corporate governance. Ball (2001) also provides arguments to support
the corporate governance function of conditional accounting conservatism. He suggests that managers
may seek to avoid negative impacts to their bonuses and promotion prospects by continuing to pursue
some existing risky investments. However, if managers know ex-ante that economic losses will be rec-
ognized early, they are less likely to take on investments that they anticipate may underperform.
In the context of bank lending, without recognising losses on a timely basis, bank managers could
be tempted to continue lending and/or increase lending to borrowers of higher credit default risks at
low spreads. This is in spite of the fact that these loans give rise to high loan losses and negative net
income in the long run. The reason why bank managers behave in this fashion is that such loans yield
positive income and increase bank managers’ bonuses and promotion prospects in the short run.
Among banks that adopt more conditionally conservative accounting, it will be less possible to defer
the recognition of loan losses to future periods. As a result, managers of the more accounting conser-
vative banks are more likely to provide for expected loan losses by making higher provisioning com-
pared to the less accounting conservative banks. Nevertheless, higher provisioning would negatively
affect current earnings and capital adequacy ratios. Since earnings and adequacy ratios are important
measures of managerial performance, bank managers would have incentives to take steps to positively
inﬂuence these measures. Based on the rationale of Ball (2001), we predict that banks with more con-
ditionally conservative accounting policies would charge higher spreads after controlling for other fac-
tors such as borrowers’ credit default risk proxied by loan provisions and borrower credit ratings.
During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, banks’ lending behaviours are also expected to be inﬂuenced by
their degree of conditional accounting conservatism. Beatty and Liao (2011) use the credit crisis theory
to argue that banks suffer a loss of capital and hence face greater regulatory capital constraints during
recessions. They suggest that banks with less timely loss recognition might not have built up sufﬁcient
loan provisions prior to economic downturns, and could have suffered greater loan losses and loss of
capital when downturns occur. As a result, such banks are more likely to reduce their lending during
recession periods than the more prudent banks. In other words, conditionally conservative accounting
policies could moderate the negative impact of recessions on the supply of bank loans to the capital
market. Based on this rationale of Beatty and Liao (2011), we predict that the increase of yield spread
during the ﬁnancial crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period will be less pronounced among banks
with timelier loss recognition.
In this study, we test the aforementioned predictions empirically through a sample of 3327 syndi-
cated loan deals based on 513 borrowers and 48 banks covering 16 countries. The countries are US, UK,
Canada, Australia, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway,
Belgium, Sweden and Finland. To capture the degree of conditional accounting conservatism among
banks, we use the Khan and Watts (2009) C-Score measure of timeliness of loss recognition for our
main tests, and the Beatty et al. (2002a) approach of employing discretionary loan loss provisions
as an alternative measure of timeliness of loss recognition for robustness. We provide empirical evi-
dence consistent with our predictions that banks that adopt more conditionally conservative account-
ing charge higher yield spreads, but increase their spread less during the ﬁnancial crisis than banks
that are less timely in their loss recognition. These ﬁndings are robust to controls for borrower, lender,
and deal characteristics. Furthermore, a novel feature of our analysis of the credit crisis is that we
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explicitly control for the incidence a form of credit rationing during the crisis. We do this by modelling
the selection of ﬁrms that are able to borrow through syndicated loans using a Heckman selection
model. This model allows for the possibility that some potential borrowers may have been unable
to borrow during the credit crisis. Our empirical results show that it is important to model selection
under the economic conditions of the credit crisis.
Our study contributes to the accounting literature in two ways. First, existing literature on timely
loss recognition focuses largely on the borrowers’ side of this accounting policy choice. For instance,
empirical evidence shows that the more accounting conservative borrowers enjoy lower cost of debt
(e.g. Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008), and that timely loss recognition among borrowers is more pro-
nounced among countries with greater reliance on debt-based ﬁnancing (Ball et al., 2008b) and among
public debt contracts with greater reliance on covenants (Nikolaev, 2010). Prior literature also exam-
ines the associations between conditional conservatism and fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting activities
(Alam and Petruska, 2012), the associations between conditional conservatism and the probability
of future bad news such as missing analyst forecasts and earnings decreases (Kim and Pevzner,
2010), and the associations between auditor tenure and conservatism in reported earnings (Jenkins
and Velury, 2008; Li, 2010). Unlike these studies, our study focuses on the lenders’ side of this account-
ing policy choice, and reveals its inﬂuence on lending behaviour. Second, among the few existing stud-
ies of bank accounting conservatism, none of them so far have evaluated the inﬂuence on yield spread.
Beatty and Liao (2011) focuses mainly on the effects of bank accounting conservatism on changes in
loans, while Bushman and Williams (2012) evaluates the impact of bank accounting conservatism on
the risk proﬁle of banks. Our focus on yield spread provides more direct evidence on the relationship
between banks’ accounting policy choices and the interest rates they charge corporate borrowers in
the capital market.
Our paper is also driven by, and contributes to public policy and accounting policy debates. In the
last 12 months the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has started to rethink its stance
towards accounting prudence/conservatism. The IASB’s conceptual framework stresses neutrality as
an important characteristic of information that is faithfully representative (para QC12, IASB, 2010).
However this view was challenged both before and after the release of the conceptual framework
and work is on-going to understand the nature of prudence/conservatism and how, in what sense,
it might be consistent with the conceptual framework. In a speech in September 2012, Hans Hooger-
vorst, the Chairman of the IASB, has recently described the notion of prudence as ‘plain common sense’
(Hoogervorst, 2012). However it is far from obvious how this view is captured in the conceptual
framework which argues that prudence is inconsistent with faithful presentation (IASB, 2010). More
recently the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), which is an inﬂuential group of
regional accounting standard setters and advisors, has argued in their Bulletin that the conceptual
framework needs to be revised to explicitly consider the role of prudence in ﬁnancial reporting
(paragraph 38, EFRAG et al., 2013).
The present paper highlights timely loss recognition as an aspect of prudence in accounting choice.
This provides an important example of how and where the notion of prudence may need to be made
more explicit within the conceptual framework. Our paper also has important policy implications for
bank regulation and control. A number of authors have noted the role of inappropriate incentives
faced by bank lenders in exacerbating the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Our evidence suggests that banks that
operated prudent accounting arrangements were less affected by the ﬁnancial crisis in terms of the
terms on which they were able to offer syndicated loans.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses.
We provide the methodology and data sample in Section 3. The empirical results are reported in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Banks differ from industrial ﬁrms in that the key components of banks’ ﬁnancial statements are
loans and fair valued instruments. Fair valued instruments tend not to exhibit differential timeliness
in the recognition of gains and losses because fair valued asset write-ups are generally recognized as
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quickly as asset write-downs.1 On the other hand, there is differential timeliness in the recognition of
loan losses versus loan gains (for example, Benston and Wall (2005) ﬁnd that book values of loans are
lower than fair values). Loan provisions are assessed largely by a credit department, independent of
the lending department. There are two main categories of loan portfolios. The ﬁrst category is a large
number of homogenous loans in small sizes such as credit cards. In this case, the credit department anal-
yses the probabilities of defaults based on statistical models and sets aside loan provisions based on a
collective assessment of the pool of loans. The second category is a smaller number of heterogeneous
loans in large sizes such as syndicated loans. In such cases, a speciﬁc loan provision is made when a loan
becomes non-performing, for example when the borrower is insolvent, taking into account collaterals
and guarantees on the loans, as well as the recovery rate.2 In this study, we focus on the large syndicated
loans, which prior literature demonstrates contain substantial discretion (Liu and Ryan, 1995).
The literature has documented that bankmanagement use their judgement and discretion in setting
loan provisions (Beatty et al., 1995; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). The incurred loan loss accounting stan-
dards allow substantial subjective judgement and evaluation on the part of the bank management,
credit control departments, lending ofﬁcers and accountants in setting loan provisions (Dugan,
2009). The evaluation criteria include borrower default risk proﬁles (including internal and external
credit risk ratings) and (current and forecasted) economic conditions. Themore prudent banks use their
discretion to be timelier in recognising loan loss provisions, i.e. they recognize loan loss provisions
quicker in their accounting response to negative economic news than loan loss recoveries in their
accounting response to positive economic news. The degree of conditional accounting conservatism
and the underlying prudence such policy choice reﬂects is likely to vary across banks due to differences
in corporate governance and management quality. For instance, Bushman and Williams (2012) show
stronger market discipline of banks’ risk-taking in countries with timelier loss recognition, and this im-
plies that conditionally conservative accounting facilitates the investors’ monitoring of banks.
Ball (2001) provides the theoretical rationale for the corporate governance role of conditional
accounting conservatism. He argues that managers may continue with losing investments because
abandonment of such investments will reduce net income and correspondingly the managers’ bonuses
and promotion prospects. At the same time, managers pursue more losing investments to increase
their short term proﬁts at the cost of negative net present value in the long run. However, managers
are less likely to carry on or pursue more losing investments if their ﬁrms adopt conditional
conservative accounting policies since they know that economic losses will be recognized early and
reﬂected in their performance. In other words, timely loss recognition helps discipline managers
against self-serving behaviour which is against the interest of shareholders.
Consistent with Ball (2001), we expect timely recognition of losses among banks to inﬂuence their
lending behaviour. Loans to borrowers with anticipated loan losses greater than interest income in the
long run are equivalent to the losing investments Ball (2001) refers to. In the absence of timely loss
recognition, bank managers may continue or increase lending to such borrowers. This is because even
though such loans may have negative performance (i.e., higher likelihood of defaults) in the long run,
they provide short-term income for the bank managers to justify their bonuses/promotion prospects.
When banks are timelier in recognising loan losses, their business proﬁtability and performance will
be affected by underperforming borrowers more quickly. As a result, these banks are expected to be
more constrained and disciplined in their pricing of bank loans. Being more prudent, the banks that
adopt more conditionally conservative accounting policies are expected to charge higher spreads than
their less conservative counterparts.
We assume that banks play a delegated monitoring role of corporate customers in which medium
to long term relations do matter to some extent. At the margin some ﬁrms will be willing to pay a
higher spread than the long run equilibrium in order to maintain their relation with the bank that best
understands their business, and in which banks’ and borrowers’ reputations matter (Diamond, 1989,
1991). These considerations open up the possibilities that some banks will be able to charge more for
1 One exception is given in Vyas (2011), which provides examples of less timely accounting write-downs of fair valued
mortgage-backed and structured credit instruments during the ﬁnancial crisis.
2 We gratefully acknowledge the inputs of an anonymous senior lending ofﬁcer and an anonymous senior accountant on the
loan provisioning process.
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the same level of default risk as part of a long term arrangement in which borrowers trade off the
higher spread in the good times against the signalling beneﬁts of being able to borrow from a prudent
bank, and the beneﬁts of having a relation with a bank that is better placed to weather difﬁcult ﬁnan-
cial times.
This leads us to our ﬁrst testable hypothesis:
H1. Banks that are timelier in loss recognition charge higher spreads than those less timely in loss
recognition.
There are factors that may bias our research design against ﬁnding empirical evidence consistent
with hypothesis H1. It is possible that the banks that recognise losses on a timelier basis do not charge
higher spreads because of the following reasons. First, such banks may lose market share if they
charge higher spreads than their less conditionally conservative competitors. Second, some borrowers,
especially the ﬁnancially stronger ones, may prefer to switch to the less conditionally conservative
banks that charge lower spreads. Finally, the banks that are timelier in recognising losses may not
want to risk losing market share by charging higher spreads due to pressures from shareholders to
achieve strong revenue growth.
Beatty and Liao (2011) draw on the credit crunch theory to argue that banks should become more
sensitive to regulatory capital constraints during recessions. They argue that banks with timelier loss
recognition would build sufﬁcient loan provisions prior to recessions, and that during the crisis periods
they enjoy stronger capital base relative to banks with less timely loss recognition. On the other hand,
the banks that delayed their recognition of loan losses prior to recessions will have to take bigger
charges against their earnings and capital during the economic downturn periods. Beatty and Liao
(2011) provide empirical evidence that banks which recognize loan provisions on a timelier basis are
less likely to reduce their lending volume during recessions than banks that delay loan loss recognition.
Consistent with Beatty and Liao (2011), we expect that timely loss recognition would inﬂuence
changes in banks’ lending behaviours during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The banks have to compete
for a smaller pool of ﬁnancially healthy borrowers during the crisis. Due to the greater capital con-
straints, banks that are less timely in loss recognition prior to the crisis must ration their loans and
charge higher spreads during the crisis. The banks that are timelier in loss recognition have stronger
capital positions and are more competitive. Hence banks that are timelier in loss recognition are ex-
pected to increase their spreads to a lesser extent than banks that are less timely in loss recognition.
This leads to our second testable hypothesis:
H2. The increase in spreads from the pre-crisis to the crisis period is lower for banks that are timelier
in loss recognition than banks less timely in loss recognition.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) raise the hypothetical possibility of a credit rationing situation when
there is an excess demand for credit that is not met. In a credit rationing situation, there is a group
of borrowers categorised by speciﬁc common characteristics, who are unable to get funding regardless
of the price they are willing to pay. There is no equilibrium market interest rate which equates the
demand to the supply. The recent credit crisis reﬂects such a scenario as bankers become risk averse
and cut back severely on lending. The bankers tighten up their internal lending standards, which re-
sults in a shock to the loan supply (Lown and Morgan, 2006). To deal with the inﬂuence of this issue in
our tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 we model the possibility that some ﬁrms may have been credit ra-
tioned using a borrower selection model.
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Asymmetric timeliness in loss recognition measure
Accounting conservatism is deﬁned as anticipating losses but not proﬁts, which results in the
deferment of gains (Watts, 2003). The conventional measure of conditional accounting conservatism
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in the prior literature is the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness coefﬁcient. The limitation of the Basu
(1997) approach is that it is estimated for a ﬁrm using a time-series of ﬁrm years. Using the same ﬁrm
across years does not consider changes in the ﬁrm’s operating characteristics and conservatism over
time. The C-Score of Khan andWatts (2009) accounts for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics such as leverage,
market to book and size to overcome these limitations. Also, C-Score is estimated in the cross-section
and unlike the Basu (1997) approach does not require time-series data. Beatty and Liao (2011) and
Francis and Martin (2010) use the C-Score methodology in their study of the effects of timely loss rec-
ognition on loan volume and investment decisions respectively. We estimate C-Scores as follows:
Xit ¼ b1 þ b2Dit þ Ritðl1 þ l2Sizeit þ l3MBit þ l4Lev itÞ þ DitRitðk1 þ k2Sizeit þ k3MBit
þ k4Lev itÞ þ ðd1Sizeit þ d2MBit þ d3Lev itÞ þ Diðd4Sizeit þ d5MBit þ d6Lev itÞ þ ei ð1Þ
where Xit is earnings scaled by shareholder’s equity; Rit is stock returns; Dit is dummy indicator equal
to one when returns is negative and zero otherwise; Sizeit is total assets; MBit is market to book ratio;
Levit is total liabilities divided by total assets (leverage). The C-Score is k1 + k2 Sizeit + k3 MBit + k4Levit.
We deﬁne dummy variable Cons as 1 for banks with C-Score above median, and 0 otherwise.
Larger ﬁrms have richer information environments (e.g. more analyst following) and lower infor-
mation asymmetry than small ﬁrms. This suggests a lower contracting demand for conservatism from
larger ﬁrms. The empirical evidence in Khan and Watts (2009) indicates a negative relation between
C-Score and size. Firms with higher market to book (M/B) ratios have higher growth options relative to
their assets. Growth options are positively related to agency costs, and conservatism is an efﬁcient cor-
porate governance response to agency costs. This suggests a positive relation between market to book
ratios and conservatism. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that ﬁrms with high market to
book ratios are less likely to be regulated, suggesting lower regulation demand for conservatism from
ﬁrms with high market to book ratios. Thus, the market to book ratio is a measure of conditional con-
servatism but its sign is not predicted (Ahmed et al., 2002; Beaver and Ryan, 2000; Khan and Watts,
2009). Higher levered ﬁrms have higher agency costs, which also increase the need for accounting
conservatism.
3.2. Test of hypothesis H1
To test H1 we augment a standard model of yield spread (e.g. Asquith et al., 2005; Beatty et al.,
2002b) by adding our bank timely loss recognition variable, as well as other control variables to ﬁt
our context:
Spreadijt ¼ a0 þ a1Consjt þ a2LLjt þ a3Ratingijt þ a4Tenorijt þ a5Dealijt þ a6Cbijt
þ a7Returnvoljt þ a8Insiderjt þ a9Separatejt þ a10ADjt þ Tranche dummies
þ Country dummiesþ Borrower industry dummiesþ ei ð2Þ
where for deal i of bank j in year t, Spreadijt is the credit spread charged to borrowers, deﬁned as the
mark-up above base rates such as Libor (London Interbank Offer Rates), Euribor (Euro Interbank Offer
Rates) or BBSY (Bank Bill Swap Bid Rates), which are reference interest rates set in London, Euro zone
and Australia respectively (the mark-ups are not above the cost of funds as the latter are not
available); Consjt is an indicator of banks’ timely loss recognition, which is assigned a value of 1 for
banks with above median level of timely loss recognition, and 0 otherwise. Based on our hypothesis
H1 we expect a1 to be strictly positive i.e., more conditionally conservative banks charge higher
spreads. LLjt is the loan loss provision of the prior period divided by total loans; Rating is the senior
long term debt rating of the borrower, with the best rating AAA given an indicator 1 and one additional
point for every one notch worsening of the credit rating; Tenor is the length of loan contract in number
of years; Deal is the log of deal size in dollar; Cb is an indicator of borrowers’ conditional accounting
conservatism, which is assigned to 1 for borrowers with above median level of Khan and Watts (2009)
C-Score, and 0 otherwise; Returnvol is an indicator of bank risk in terms of the dispersion of returns and
is measured as the average standard deviation of daily returns for each lagging bank/year; Insider is
the percentage of non-independent directors in the board of the bank; Separate is 1 when the position
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of CEO and board chairman is separate for the bank, and 0 otherwise; AD is the percentage of
directors in the board of bank holding outside directorships. Table 1 provides the variable deﬁnitions.
We also control for the ﬁxed effects of tranche (26 dummy variables), bank country (16 dummy vari-
ables), and borrower industries (26 dummy variables). The description of deal tranches, and borrower
industries are provided in Appendices A and B respectively. Coefﬁcient a2 indicates the relationship
between the yield spread charged in syndicated loan deals and banks’ degree of timely loss
recognition.
Our choice of control variables follows existing literature. We expect a positive relation between
Spread and LL because higher LL may suggest greater loan uncertainty and higher default risk (e.g.,
Ho and Saunders, 1981). Consistent with Asquith et al. (2005) and Beatty et al. (2002b), we expect
Spread to be positively related to Rating because the required returns are higher for poorer rated
borrowers. We also expect Spread to be negatively related with Tenor and Deal since loans with longer
tenor and larger size are typically charged lower rates. Consistent with Zhang (2008), we expect Cb to
be negatively related with Spread, since conditionally conservative borrowers enjoy a lower cost of
debt. We also control for banks’ dispersion of returns through the Returnvolmeasure following Laeven
and Levine (2009). Garcia Lara et al. (2009) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) ﬁnd that a stronger cor-
porate governance structure (for example a lower percentage of insider directors on the board) leads
to higher levels of accounting conservatism. In the context of banking, we posit that a stronger gov-
ernance structure may induce more conditionally conservative accounting and more prudent lending
behaviours. We additionally control for corporate governance effect through variables such as Insider
and Separate.
3.3. Test of hypothesis H2
To test hypothesis H2, we introduce a crisis dummy into our yield spread model to get Eq. (3):
Table 1
Variable deﬁnition.
Variable Deﬁnition
Spread Credit spread charged to borrowers, which is margin above base rates such as Libor (London Interbank Offer
Rates), Euribor (Euro Interbank Offer Rates) or BBSY (Bank Bill Swap Offer Rates)a
Rating Senior long term debt rating of the borrower, with the best rating AAA given an indicator 1 and one additional
point for one notch worsening of credit rating
Tenor Term/length of loan contract in number of years
Deal Logarithm of dollar deal size
LL Loan provisions prior period divided by total loans
Cds Bank sector CDS rates in multiples of 100 points
Cons Dummy indicator 1 for more conditionally conservative banks 0 for less conditionally conservative banks
based on the bank C score ranking per Khan and Watts (2009)
Crisis Dummy indicator 1 for 2008 and 2009, otherwise zero
Cb Dummy indicator 1 for more conditionally conservative borrowers, 0 for less conditionally conservative
borrowers based on the borrower C score ranking per Khan and Watts (2009)
Insider Percentage of insiders (deﬁned as executive directors) in the board of directors of the bank
Separate Dummy indicator as 1 when the position of CEO and board chairman for the bank is separate, 0 otherwise
AD Percentage of directors in the board of bank holding outside directorships
Returnvol Daily return standard deviation average for each lagging bank/year as an indicator of each bank’s risk taking
Bcrisis Borrower selection indicator as 1 if borrower has loan deals during the crisis, 0 otherwise
NI Net income scaled by shareholder’s equitya
Lsize Natural logarithm of total assetsa
Lev Leverage derived from total liabilities divided by total assetsa
Workcap Working capital scaled by total assetsa
Sales Change of sales from prior period to current period scaled by shareholder’s equitya
MB Ratio of market value to net book valuea
DLL Discretionary loan loss provisions
DNPL Change in non-performing loans year on year
a Winzorized at 1% and 99% levels.
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Spreadijt ¼ a0 þ a1Consjt þ a2Crisist  Consjt þ a3Crisist þ a4LLjt þ a5Ratingijt þ a6Tenorijt
þ a7Dealijt þ a8Cbijt þ a9Returnvoljt þ a10Insiderjt þ a11Separatejt þ a12ADjt
þ Tranche dummiesþ Country dummiesþ Borrower industry dummiesþ e ð3Þ
where Crisis is an indicator of the ﬁnancial crisis, and assigned a value of 1 for years 2008 and 2009,
and 0 for prior years. Crisist  Consjt, the interaction between Crisist and Consjt is the main variable of
interest to test H2. We expect the sign on a2 to be negative i.e., the more conditionally conservative
banks increase their spreads less in the crisis period relative to the less conditionally conservative
banks. In other words, timely loss recognition moderates the impact of the crisis on yield spread. This
ﬁnding would be consistent with hypothesis H2. All other variables are deﬁned as for Eq. (2) and
Table 1. Coefﬁcient a3 indicates the effect of the ﬁnancial crisis on the yield spread charged by banks
with less timely loss recognition. This coefﬁcient is expected to be positive.
3.4. Borrower selection model
The credit rationing situation during the crisis may cause a sample selection bias because
borrowers with speciﬁc characteristics (for example poorer ﬁnancial health conditions) are unable
to obtain bank ﬁnancing at that time (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In order to control for this bias, we
use a two-stage Heckman test. The ﬁrst-stage is a probit selection model as follows:
Bcrisis ¼ a0 þ a1Rating þ a2NI þ a3LSizeþ a4Lev þ a5Workcapþ a6Salesþ a7MB
þ a8Tenor þ a9Dealþ Borrower country dummiesþ Borrower industry dummies
þ Tranche dummiesþ e ð4Þ
where Bcrisis is 1 when borrowers have loan deals during the crisis, and 0 otherwise; NI is net income
scaled by shareholders’ equity; LSize is borrower size measured as log total assets; Lev is borrower
leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; Workcap measures the liquidity of bor-
rowers and is measured as working capital divided by total assets; Sales is growth in revenue; MB
is the market-to-book ratio. Other control variables such as Rating, Tenor, Deals, Borrower dummies,
and Tranche dummies are as deﬁned in Eqs. (2) and (3) above. Firms that are more likely to borrow
during the ﬁnancial crisis are expected to be those with larger size, and higher market-to-book value.
With regards to loan tenor Tenor and loan size Deal, borrowers which borrow more for longer periods
prior to the crisis are less likely to obtain new loans during the crisis. Credit rating, leverage, working
capital, and sales can affect the likelihood of borrowing during the crisis in two ways. On the one hand,
ﬁrms with poorer credit rating, more leverage, less working capital, and lower sales growth may be in
poorer ﬁnancial health and are less able to borrow during the crisis. On the other hand, such ﬁrms may
be more dependent on bank ﬁnancing and are more willing to pay higher spread during the crisis.
3.5. Data
Syndicated loans are chosen for our research because they constitute a signiﬁcant component of
the loan market, representing about 7% of a typical bank’s balance sheet on December 2011 (BIS
Quarterly Review, 2012), and syndicated loans provide higher underwriting revenues than either
the equity or the bond market (Ball et al., 2008a). Large syndicated loans provide observable data
to study differences in lending behaviour across banks.
The syndicated loan deals are obtained from the Dealscan Loan Connector database. The deal obser-
vations are extracted for the years 2006–2009. The start year is 2006 because the European banks start
applying IAS 39 in 2005. The loan provision is the amount of loan loss expense (net of recovery) in the
bank income statement, extracted from either annual reports or Compustat. The reason for using the
loan loss expense (net of recovery) is that the lending ofﬁcers’ performance evaluation is affected by
this net of recovery ﬁgure and not just by the increase in loan loss allowance charged to the income.
The loan provisions lead the deal data (for example spreads) by 1 year in order to study the effects of
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loan provisions on bank lending behaviour. The loan provisions are scaled by the total loan
outstanding.
In order to capture the effects of timeliness in loss recognition on the most signiﬁcant players in the
global syndication loan market, and to maximize the number of deal observations, we select banks
based on the rankings in the 2009 global syndication league table (provided by Reuters LPC Corpora-
tion). The study covers US, UK, Western European, Canadian and Australian banks in the top 130 posi-
tions of the 2009 book runner league table. The banks that have been delisted within the 2005–2008
sample period have either missing data or are not in the league table. Banks whose loan provision ac-
counts are not available either because the banks are not publicly listed or because the banks fair value
their loan portfolios are excluded. The total deal size of the selected banks comprises 69% of the mar-
ket share within the top 130 positions.
For the borrower and deal characteristics, we use the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) long term senior
debt rating of borrowers (as most of the syndicated deals are long term), borrower country, borrower
industry, loan tenor, loan deal size and all-in drawn spread3 in Dealscan. Deal observations are dropped
when there are missing data in any of the ﬁelds. Banks with missing stock prices, net income or non-per-
forming loan data to calculate the conditional conservatism measure are dropped from the sample. The
selection criteria leaves a total of 513 borrowers and 48 banks covering 16 countries that span US, UK,
Europe, Canada and Australia. The above deal, bank and borrower selection criteria give us a sample size
of 3327 deals from the original sample size of 26,696. The selection process is shown in Table 2.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression tests. Panels A, B,
and C are based on the full sample period, the pre-crisis period, and the crisis period respectively.
In terms of deals, the average Spread is the main dependent variable in our analyses, the average is
140 basis points for the full sample period, with 100 basis points prior to the crisis and 210 basis
points during the crisis. The maximum spread of 700 basis points is charged to a B rated borrower dur-
ing the crisis. The minimum spread of zero basis points is granted to a borrower with a AAA rating
prior to the crisis period. The average loan tenor is 4.4 years for the full sample period. It shortens from
an average of 4.8 years in the pre-crisis period to 3.6 years during the crisis period. The average dollar
deal size declines by 5% from the pre-crisis to the crisis period.4
On the lenders’ side, the average Cons is 0.664 over the full sample period, which indicates that
more than half of the deals are done by banks which recognise losses on a timelier basis. The average
loan provision is 1.1% of total loans over the full sample period, and hits a maximum of 40% of total
loans during the crisis. On the borrowers’ side, the mean rating over the full sample period is 10
Table 2
Sample selection.
Criteria Observations
Original sample after excluding deals with missing values in any variables 26,696 for 70 banks, 2665
borrowers
Eliminating borrowers with missing data to calculate borrower conservatism
measure
5511 for 70 banks, 717 borrowers
Eliminating borrowers with missing data in the ﬁrst stage selection equation 4178 for 70 banks, 513 borrowers
Eliminating banks with missing data to calculate conditional conservatism measures 3327 for 48 banks, 513 borrowers
3 We use spreads instead of yield rate as the yield rate includes the benchmark rate, such as the Libor which is driven by central
bank interest rate while spreads capture the credit default risks of the borrowers.
4 Based on un-tabulated analyses, the drop in the number of deals from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period amounts to 85%.
Out of this decline, 70% is attributed to borrowers who have had deals prior to the crisis and stop borrowing during the crisis. This
sharp decline in the number of deals points to a possibility of a credit rationing situation documented in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Panel A: Full sample (3327 obs) Panel B: Pre-crisis sample (2276 obs) Panel C: During-crisis sample (1051 obs)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Spread 0.014 0.012 0.000 0.070 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.070 0.007 0.021 0.015 0.000 0.070 0.023
LL 0.011 0.041 0.001 0.400 0.004 0.008 0.034 0.001 0.363 0.003 0.019 0.053 0.000 0.400 0.006
Rating 10.306 3.263 1.000 21.000 11.000 10.224 3.371 1.000 21.000 11.000 10.484 3.011 1.000 18.000 10.000
Tenor 4.395 1.838 0.000 23.000 5.000 4.770 1.404 0.000 10.333 5.000 3.584 2.339 0.000 23.000 3.000
Deal 7.103 1.332 2.708 10.915 7.003 7.199 1.343 2.996 10.597 7.090 6.895 1.282 2.708 10.915 6.802
Cons 0.664 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.647 0.478 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.701 0.458 0.000 1.000 1.000
Crisis 0.316 0.465 0.000 1.000 0.000
Cb 0.426 0.495 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.444 0.497 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.386 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.000
Insider 0.153 0.116 0.000 0.727 0.125 0.141 0.105 0.000 0.583 0.125 0.178 0.132 0.000 0.727 0.133
Separate 0.520 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.470 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.630 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000
AD 0.756 0.154 0.238 1.000 0.778 0.765 0.156 0.238 1.000 0.786 0.736 0.146 0.294 1.000 0.765
Returnvol 0.173 0.057 0.098 0.512 0.152 0.156 0.043 0.098 0.297 0.145 0.211 0.065 0.127 0.512 0.204
NI 0.208 0.523 2.162 4.911 0.161 0.206 0.367 2.162 4.911 0.158 0.211 0.758 2.162 4.911 0.163
Lsize 8.679 1.813 2.262 16.221 8.524 8.652 1.861 2.702 16.221 8.558 8.736 1.702 2.262 12.803 8.474
Lev 0.600 0.161 0.121 0.993 0.597 0.596 0.156 0.121 0.993 0.595 0.610 0.171 0.121 0.993 0.598
Workcap 0.112 0.158 0.326 0.673 0.074 0.116 0.159 0.219 0.673 0.078 0.104 0.156 0.326 0.673 0.067
Sales 0.354 0.962 2.590 13.778 0.209 0.366 0.905 2.590 13.778 0.219 0.327 1.073 2.590 8.481 0.174
MB 3.283 3.350 0.001 19.695 2.421 3.377 3.042 0.001 19.695 2.703 3.078 3.930 0.001 19.695 1.829
All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Pre-crisis years include 2006 and 2007. During the crisis years include 2008 and 2009.
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Table 4
Correlation matrix.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Spread 1.00
2 LL 0.03 1.00
3 Rating 0.55* 0.07* 1.00
4 Tenor 0.04 0.07* 0.29* 1.00
5 Deal 0.29* 0.09* 0.32* 0.07* 1.00
6 Cons 0.03 0.13* 0.00 0.01 0.03* 1.00
7 Crisis 0.43* 0.12* 0.04 0.30* 0.11* 0.05* 1.00
8 Cb 0.07* 0.01 0.11* 0.01 0.34* 0.01 0.05* 1.00
9 Insider 0.04 0.05* 0.03 0.02 0.19* 0.30* 0.15* 0.03 1.00
10 Separate 0.02 0.12* 0.03 0.06* 0.23* 0.01 0.15* 0.09* 0.37* 1.00
11 AD 0.05* 0.15* 0.05* 0.06* 0.15* 0.13* 0.09* 0.06* 0.39* 0.27* 1.00
12 Returnvol 0.38* 0.02 0.12* 0.13* 0.06* 0.09* 0.45* 0.00 0.04 0.09* 0.14* 1.00
13 NI 0.18* 0.07* 0.16* 0.05* 0.10* 0.02 0.00 0.08* 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05* 1.00
14 Lsize 0.38* 0.07* 0.60* 0.21* 0.59* 0.06* 0.02 0.19* 0.12* 0.15* 0.11* 0.03 0.04 1.00
15 Lev 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07* 0.10* 0.02 0.04 0.73* 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07* 0.20* 0.14* 1.00
16 Workcap 0.15* 0.08* 0.21* 0.09* 0.20* 0.07* 0.04 0.13* 0.09* 0.10* 0.02 0.01 0.06* 0.27* 0.25* 1.00
17 Sales 0.08* 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.07* 0.00 0.02 0.14* 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.35* 0.08* 0.23* 0.00 1.00
18 MB 0.07* 0.06* 0.14* 0.06* 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.24* 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.47* 0.15* 0.22* 0.10* 0.32* 1.00
This table provides Pearson correlations of variables used in our analyses. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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(BBB-) and borrowers within the A to B+ rating category make up 68% (mean plus/minus one stan-
dard deviation) of the market segment. This indicates that the syndicated loan is a market tailored for
borrowers in the middle tier of credit ratings because top rated borrowers generally can raise funds via
other means such as bond issues. Over the full sample period, the mean net income is 21% of share-
holder’s equity. The average leverage is 60%, which shows that the borrowers are generally highly lev-
ered. Moreover, the borrowers have weak liquidity positions, with working capital making up only
11% of the overall balance sheet. The historical sales growth of the borrowers is generally strong at
35%. The average market to book ratio is healthy at 3.3. These statistics show that the borrowers have
healthy proﬁtability and growth performance, but they have weak liquidity positions and take on high
levels of debt.
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations between the variables in our analyses. Spread is positively
correlated with borrower ratings (Ratings) and the crisis period indicator (Crisis). This indicates that
banks charge higher yield spreads to borrowers of higher default risks, and during the ﬁnancial crisis.
The high positive correlation of 0.55 between Spread and Ratings indicate that the borrowers that were
charged higher spreads have poorer credit ratings. Also, the signiﬁcant positive correlation between
Spread and Returnvol highlights the importance of controlling for dispersion of bank returns in our
multivariate analyses of H1 and H2. Spread is negatively correlated with deal size (Deal), borrower size
(Lsize), and borrower growth (MB). This indicates lower spreads among larger size loans, and larger or
higher growth borrowers. The positive correlation between Spread and the percentage of directors on
the board holding outside directorship (AD) suggests that banks with stronger corporate governance
are more prudent and charge higher spreads.
The correlation of banks’ timely loss recognition measure Cons with Spread is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant on a univariate basis. However, Cons is positively correlated with loan loss provision (LL),
which indicates that banks that adopt more conditionally conservative accounting policies are associ-
ated with higher loan loss provisions. There is also a statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation be-
tween Cons and Returnvol, which indicates that banks timelier in recognizing losses have lower
dispersion of returns. Regarding the more signiﬁcant correlations among the remaining variables,
the positive correlation between loan provisions (LL) and Crisis shows that during the crisis the banks
have higher loan loss provisions. Lsize is negatively correlated with Rating and Tenor, and this shows
that larger borrowers have better credit ratings and borrow loans of shorter tenors. The positive cor-
relation between Lsize and Deal shows that the dollar deal size is higher for the loans to larger
borrowers.
Appendix B shows the geographical and industry distribution of borrowers. In Panel A, the US is the
largest country segment of borrowers (83%) and contributes to the biggest drop in borrowers during
the credit crisis. Canada takes the second spot in the market segment, with 5% of the market segment,
while the UK takes the third spot with 4% of the market segment. In un-tabulated results, the bank
timeliness in loss recognition is not higher in speciﬁc countries or legal regimes than in others. This
is in contrast to the industrial ﬁrms, which are timelier in loss recognition in common law countries
(US, UK, Canada and Australia) than in code law countries (Europe) (Ball et al., 2000). In Panel B, gen-
eral manufacturing, oil and gas and utilities, are the industry segments with the highest number of
borrowers. The drop in borrowers during the credit crisis is evenly distributed among all the industry
segments. This shows that the credit crisis is broad based and impacts all industries. In un-tabulated
results, the industry sectors with borrowers that are more (less) timely in loss recognition are utilities
(mining).
4.2. Test of borrower selection
Table 5 shows the results of the Probit borrower selection model i.e. Eq. (4). We observe signiﬁ-
cantly positive coefﬁcients on Rating, Lsize, and Lev. These indicate borrowers during the crisis period
are more likely to be ﬁrms that are poorer in credit rating, larger in size, and more dependent on bank
ﬁnancing. We observe signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients on Workcap, Sales, Tenor, and Deals. This sug-
gests that borrowers during the crisis period are less likely to be ﬁrms that have higher liquidity, more
growth, borrow for longer periods, and borrow more.
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4.3. Tests of hypothesis H1
Table 6 reports the results for the tests of hypothesis H1. Regression 1 excludes the controls for
corporate governance, and Regression 2 includes these controls. Regression 3 further controls for bor-
rower selection bias. The coefﬁcient of Cons is positive and statistically signiﬁcant throughout Table 6.
For instance, the positive coefﬁcient of 0.0028 in Regression 1 shows that the banks timelier in loss
recognition charge higher spreads of 28 basis points. In other words, we have robust evidence that
banks with timelier loss recognition are associated with higher yield spreads in their syndicated loans.
These results are consistent with hypothesis H1, and they imply that banks adopting more condition-
ally conservative accounting policies are more prudent in their loan pricing decisions.
Table 6
Test of hypothesis H1.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
Cons 0.0028 (0.000) 0.0023 (0.000) 0.0014 (0.001)
LL 0.0209 (0.000) 0.0236 (0.000) 0.0150 (0.004)
Rating 0.0019 (0.000) 0.0019 (0.000) 0.0020 (0.000)
Tenor 0.0008 (0.000) 0.0008 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.012)
Deal 0.0011 (0.000) 0.0011 (0.000) 0.0007 (0.000)
Cb 0.0001 (0.766) 0.0001 (0.742) 0.0013 (0.000)
Returnvol 0.0731 (0.000) 0.0730 (0.000) 0.0492 (0.000)
Insider 0.0061 (0.037) 0.0052 (0.054)
Separate 0.0006 (0.197) 0.0005 (0.167)
AD 0.0038 (0.018) 0.0035 (0.016)
IMR 0.0065 (0.000)
Intercept 0.0090 (0.157) 0.0002 (0.951) 0.0203 (0.001)
Tranche dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 (overall) 0.4876 0.4960 0.5618
Obs 3327 3327 3327
This table presents the results tests of hypothesis H1. The dependent variable, Spread, is the credit spread charged to borrowers.
All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. IMR is inverse Mills ratio derived from the ﬁrst-stage Probit regression in Table 5.
Table 5
First stage equation on selection of borrowers during the crisis.
Variables Coeff p-Value
Rating 0.0335 (0.010)
NI 0.0880 (0.127)
Lsize 0.1055 (0.001)
Lev 1.4801 (0.000)
Workcap 0.5436 (0.011)
Sales 0.0657 (0.042)
MB 0.0033 (0.753)
Tenor 0.2873 (0.000)
Deal 0.2765 (0.000)
Intercept 0.0054 (0.989)
Borrow Country dummies Yes
Borrow Industry dummies Yes
Tranche dummies Yes
Pseudo R2 0.3258
Obs 3327
This table presents the results from the ﬁrst-stage Probit regression of a Heck-
man test to address the selection of borrowers during the crisis. Dependent
variable is Bcrisis, which is 1 if borrower has deal in during the crisis period of
2008–2009, and 0 otherwise. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
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The coefﬁcient on LL is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant throughout Table 6. The positive
coefﬁcient of LL shows that the banks charge higher spreads when loan provisions increase. For in-
stance, in Regression 1, the positive coefﬁcient 0.0209 means that for every 1% increase in loan provi-
sions as a proportion of total loans, the spreads charged borrowers increase by 2 basis points.
In Table 6, the signs of the control variable coefﬁcients are largely consistent with intuition. Across
Regressions 1–3, the Rating coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive, which indicates that poorer rated bor-
rowers are charged higher spreads, consistent with the ﬁndings in Asquith et al. (2005) and Beatty
et al. (2002b). In Regressions 2 and 3, the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on Insider and the positive
coefﬁcient on AD show that banks with stronger corporate governance charge higher spreads. The sig-
niﬁcantly positive Returnvol coefﬁcients in Regressions 1–3 show that banks with higher return dis-
persion charge higher spreads. In Regression 3, we observe a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the inverse
Mills ratio (IMR) from the results of the borrower selection model in Table 5. This conﬁrms the impor-
tance of controlling for sample selection bias. The addition of IMR variable improves the R2 by 7%, i.e.
from 0.4960 in Regression 2 to 0.5618 in Regression 3.
4.4. Tests of hypothesis H2
Table 7 presents the results for the test of hypothesis H2. Regression 1 excludes the controls for
corporate governance, and Regression 2 includes these controls. Regression 3 further controls for bor-
rower selection bias. The Crisis coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive throughout Table 7. For instance, it is
0.0108 in Regression 1, and this indicates that, during the crisis banks increase their spreads by 108
basis points. This ﬁnding suggests banks charge higher spreads during the crisis than before. The coef-
ﬁcient on the interaction term Crisis⁄Cons is signiﬁcantly negative throughout Table 7. For instance, it
is 0.0022 in Regression 1, and this demonstrates that during the crisis, the banks that are timelier in
loss recognition increase their spreads to a lesser extent (by 22 basis points) than those less timely in
loss recognition. These ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis H2. They suggest that timely loss rec-
ognition moderates the sensitivity of the yield spread to the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis. In other
words, banks that adopt more conditionally conservative accounting policies exhibit less pro-cyclical
loan pricing behaviour.
Table 7
Test of hypothesis H2.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
Cons 0.0022 (0.000) 0.0017 (0.000) 0.0012 (0.004)
Crisis  Cons 0.0022 (0.001) 0.0021 (0.001) 0.0018 (0.004)
Crisis 0.0108 (0.000) 0.0108 (0.000) 0.0078 (0.000)
LL 0.0113 (0.024) 0.0135 (0.009) 0.0099 (0.045)
Rating 0.0020 (0.000) 0.0019 (0.000) 0.0020 (0.000)
Tenor 0.0002 (0.011) 0.0002 (0.015) 0.0004 (0.000)
Deal 0.0003 (0.028) 0.0003 (0.027) 0.0003 (0.060)
Cb 0.0008 (0.013) 0.0009 (0.012) 0.0004 (0.211)
Returnvol 0.0376 (0.000) 0.0374 (0.000) 0.0299 (0.000)
Insider 0.0057 (0.034) 0.0052 (0.043)
Separate 0.0001 (0.818) 0.0002 (0.532)
AD 0.0040 (0.007) 0.0037 (0.008)
IMR 0.0049 (0.000)
Intercept 0.0063 (0.285) 0.0042 (0.485) 0.0151 (0.008)
Tranche dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 (overall) 0.5596 0.5707 0.5963
Obs 3327 3327 3327
This table presents the results tests of hypothesis H2. Dependent variable is Spread, which is the credit spread charged to
borrowers. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. IMR is inverse Mills ratio derived from the ﬁrst-stage Probit regression in Table 5.
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The coefﬁcient on Cons is signiﬁcantly positive. This indicates that prior to the crisis, banks with
timelier loss recognition charged higher spreads. The coefﬁcients of LL are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. This shows that the banks charged higher spreads when loan provisions increased. Consis-
tent with Table 6, the coefﬁcient of IMR is again statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates the impor-
tance to control for borrower selection bias in our analyses.
4.5. Additional tests
We conduct additional tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 using discretionary loan provisions as an
alternative proxy for banks’ timely loss recognition.
The discretionary loan loss provisions are the residuals from a regression of loan loss provisions
(LL) controlling for the change in non-performing loans (DNPL), in line with Beatty et al. (1995,
2002a). As our sample is international banks, we hand collect the change in non-performing loans var-
iable for our sample banks.
Banks which recognize loan provisions on a timelier basis are expected to have higher discre-
tionary loan provisions. To conﬁrm our hypotheses, we ﬁrst test whether banks that have higher
discretionary loan loss provisions charge higher spreads. We then go onto examine that banks
that make higher discretionary loan loss provisions increase their spreads less in the crisis period
relative to banks that make lower discretionary loan loss provisions. To test H1 and H2 using
discretionary loan loss provisions, we re-estimate our models 2 and 3 by replacing the C-Score
measure with the DLL (discretionary loan loss provisions) measure. Table 8 presents the results
of these tests.
In Table 8, Regressions 1 and 2 report the results of tests for hypothesis 1 before and after adding
the inverse Mills ratio from the borrower selection model in Table 5. The DLL coefﬁcients are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in both cases, which is consistent with hypothesis H1.
Regressions 3 and 4 consider the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis, and show the results before and after
adding IMR the inverse Mills ratio from borrower selection model of Table 5. As expected the coefﬁ-
cient on the interaction term Crisis  DLL is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with
hypothesis H2.
Table 8
Additional tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 using discretionary loan loss provisions.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value Coeff p-Value
DLL 0.0260 (0.000) 0.0159 (0.003) 0.0216 (0.000) 0.0183 (0.000)
Crisis  DLL 0.0121 (0.011) 0.0162 (0.003)
Crisis 0.0079 (0.000) 0.0055 (0.000)
Rating 0.0020 (0.000) 0.0019 (0.000) 0.0020 (0.000) 0.0019 (0.000)
Tenor 0.0005 (0.065) 0.0003 (0.049) 0.0002 (0.145) 0.0004 (0.006)
Deal 0.0009 (0.000) 0.0007 (0.000) 0.0004 (0.015) 0.0003 (0.018)
Cb 0.0000 (0.986) 0.0010 (0.004) 0.0005 (0.106) 0.0003 (0.337)
Returnvol 0.1042 (0.000) 0.0771 (0.000) 0.0638 (0.000) 0.0552 (0.000)
Insider 0.0053 (0.119) 0.0056 (0.075) 0.0028 (0.386) 0.0030 (0.325)
Separate 0.0012 (0.011) 0.0009 (0.026) 0.0004 (0.368) 0.0004 (0.368)
AD 0.0143 (0.000) 0.0103 (0.000) 0.0104 (0.000) 0.0082 (0.000)
IMR 0.0057 (0.000) 0.0046 (0.000)
Intercept 0.0311 (0.000) 0.0237 (0.000) 0.0297 (0.000) 0.0244 (0.000)
Tranche dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (overall) 0.5987 0.6479 0.6389 0.6652
Obs 2983 2983 2983 2983
This table presents the additional results tests of hypotheses H1 and H2. Dependent variable is Spread, which the credit spread
charged to borrowers. DLL is discretionary loan loss provision and is used as a proxy for bank timely loss recognition. All
variables are deﬁned in Table 1. IMR is inverse Mills ratio derived from the ﬁrst-stage Probit regression in Table 5.
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5. Conclusion
This study examines the effect of timeliness in bank loss recognition on the yield spread charged on
syndicated loans. We highlight two main ﬁndings. First, timely loss recognition among banks is pos-
itively related to the prudence of bank lending decisions in terms of loan pricing. Banks timelier in loss
recognition charge higher spreads. The results remain statistically signiﬁcant after controlling for a
series of bank, borrower and deal characteristics, as well as corporate governance and bank return dis-
persion. This ﬁnding is consistent with the governance role of conditional accounting conservatism
suggested by Ball (2001).
Second, as the period under study straddles the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, it provides us with
a setting to examine how the relationship between timeliness in loss recognition and loan pricing
changes during the credit crisis. The results show that banks that are timelier in loss recognition
are likely to exhibit more prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour. This result is robust
to a control for the possibility that the sample of borrowers may be truncated during the credit crisis
due to credit rationing. This result is broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of Beatty and Liao (2011)
that the banks timelier in loss recognition set aside more loan provisions prior to recessions, and as
a result, these banks face lower credit crisis effects.
We have argued that banks that choose to account for losses in a timely way are less likely to make
bad loan decisions. In part this is because loan ofﬁcers have a greater incentive to avoid making bad
loans if losses are recognised in a timely fashion. This provides an explanation for both our pre and
post crisis results. An alternative explanation is that our post crisis results could be due purely to eco-
nomic differences between the banks, with some banks making smarter lending decisions than others.
It is true that if some banks operated better informed lending policies this would have resulted in
them having lower losses in the crisis, and in them being able to offer lower spreads during the crisis
(i.e. they would not have to increase their spreads by as much as the less informed banks during the
crisis). However this argument does not explain why we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the pre-
crisis spreads and conservative accounting for loan losses. Nevertheless it is logically possible that
banks that are timelier in loss recognition tend to know their business better. In this case it is possible
that our post crisis results could be due to the fact that they know their business better rather than
their relatively conservative accounting practices.
Our study contributes to two strands of the accounting literature. First, existing literature on con-
ditional conservatism pays more attention to whether the adoption of this accounting policy by bor-
rowers affects their cost of debt. Our study focuses instead on whether the adoption of this accounting
policy by lenders affects the required returns they charge their borrowers. In other words, conditional
accounting conservatism could inﬂuence the cost of debt in the capital market not only through the
borrowers or demand side, but also through lenders or supply side. Second, existing studies on banks’
accounting conservatism focus mainly on changes in the loan and risk proﬁles of banks. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst study to link bank conservatism to yield spread, which we argue pro-
vides more direct evidence of the impact of accounting policy choice on asset pricing in debt markets.
Our evidence also informs public policy debates by highlighting the importance of articulating
more clearly the role of prudence in the accounting conceptual framework. While the IASB has focused
on neutrality in place of prudence, the EFRAG, together with the UK, French, German and Italian
accounting bodies have released a bulletin to discuss the role of prudence in the framework (EFRAG
et al., 2013). Our research provides evidence that banks that exercise conditional conservatism tend
to exhibit more prudent and less pro-cyclical loan pricing behaviour. We agree with EFRAG et al. that
there are both ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ forms of prudence, and the conceptual framework needs to pay more
attention to recognising and elaborating on this.
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Appendix A. Deal tranche and borrower rating
Panel A: Tranche purpose Panel B: Borrower rating
Purpose Tranche indicator S&P LT senior debt Rating indicator
Acquisition. Line 1 AAA 1
Aircraft ﬁnance 2 AA+ 2
Capital expenditure. 3 AA 3
Corporate purposes 4 AA 4
CP backup 5 A+ 5
Debt Repayment 6 A 6
Debtor-in-possession 7 A 7
Dividend Recapitalization 8 BBB+ 8
Equipment Purchase 9 BBB 9
Exit ﬁnancing 10 BBB 10
Guarantee 11 BB+ 11
Infrastructure 12 BB 12
IPO Related. Financing 13 BB 13
LBO 14 B+ 14
Pre-Export 15 B 15
Project. Finance 16 B 16
Real estate 17 CCC+ 17
Recapitalization 18 CCC 18
Restructuring 19 CCC 19
Securities Purchase 20 CC+ 20
Ship ﬁnance 21 CC 21
Spinoff 22 CC 22
Stock buyback 23 C+ 23
Takeover 24 C 24
Trade ﬁnance 25 C 25
Working capital 26 D+ 26
D 27
Appendix B. Distribution of borrowers
Panel A: Country Total Panel B: Industry Total
Canada 27 Aerospace and Defence 15
Finland 3 Agriculture 2
France 5 Automotive 14
Germany 15 Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 15
Italy 3 Business Services 9
Mexico 2 Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber Manufacturing 30
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Appendix B (continued)
Panel A: Country Total Panel B: Industry Total
Netherlands 3 Construction 13
Russia 6 Financial Services 10
Sweden 3 General Manufacturing 65
United Kingdom 19 Healthcare 32
US 427 Hotel & Gaming 10
Leisure and Entertainment 5
Media 18
Mining 12
Oil and Gas 59
Paper & Packaging 13
Restaurants 7
Retail & Supermarkets 35
Services 12
Shipping 6
Technology 29
Telecommunications 12
Textiles and Apparel 10
Transportation 10
Utilities 53
Wholesale 17
Grand Total 513 Grand Total 513
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